CO129-215 - Governor Sir Bowen - 1884 [1-4] — Page 38

CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案 All AI Reviewed

Enclosure.

36

# THE FORTIFICATION OF HONG-KONG.

The position of Hongkong as an entrepôt for British trade and as an important link in the chain of outposts by which British commerce with the East is nourished and protected, has been well defined by Captain Colomb and other writers. The value of this small Colony politically and commercially is great enough to entitle it to rank as the Malta of the East. As the farthest outpost of the vast and scattered dependencies of the British Empire, it should most assuredly be so defended as to render its easy retention in time of war a matter of no possible doubt. But is this the fact? It is generally admitted that any great European Power would have little difficulty, in the event of a war, in entering these waters and levying a heavy indemnity upon the Colony. As there is never less than a million and a half sterling in bullion in Hongkong, the opportunity of seizing this treasure would be a strong temptation to a nation like Russia to make a sudden descent upon it.

But, it may be objected, England is not at war, and there is, happily, no prospect of any rupture with either of the great European Powers. The piping times of peace may, however, at any moment vanish through some unlooked for dispute, unexpected aggression. As the illustrious Washington truly remarked, in one of his most famous speeches, “to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." And, similarly, to render Hongkong an impregnable fortress would be the best method of deterring attack.

We believe that a scheme for the efficient fortification of this colony has been prepared and, if not actually approved, has been in consideration by the Imperial Government for some years past. The cost is estimated at something like £400,000, and the project is, as may be imagined, a large and effective one. But the expense is apparently the impediment to the progress of the work: the Home Government do not relish the outlay of so large a sum on a distant dependency. Out of sight, out of mind is a homely proverb which unfortunately applies only too well to the relations of the Imperial Government with its smaller Crown Colonies, and action with regard to them seldom comes before the imperative necessity for it has been unmistakably demonstrated.

It would surely be a great mistake to wait for such a necessity to be shown in the case of the fortifications of Hongkong. Moreover, the question is not only a colonial question, it is an imperial one. It cannot even be pleaded that the Colony is a source of expense to the Home Government. Hongkong has long maintained itself, and has for some twenty years past contributed twenty thousand pounds sterling per annum towards the cost of the garrison. We do not for a moment dispute the fairness of this contribution, for the Colony can well afford it, but seeing that the garrison is maintained primarily for Imperial purposes, the annual contribution should be devoted to the work of fortifying the place. This was done in the case of the Ionian Islands when they were under British rule. The military contribution there was regularly spent upon the defences of the islands, and there is no reason why the same rule should not be applied to Hongkong.

This Colony has already paid into the Imperial Treasury a sum sufficient to cover the cost of the proposed scheme of fortification. But this is not all: indirectly a further involuntary contribution is being made by the Colony which does no good to anyone. It is estimated that the land which is now reserved in case it should be required for the projected fortifications would yield an income of some ten to fifteen thousand pounds a year, all of which is lost by the land lying idle. This is a waste that proves of advantage to no one, and should be put a stop to as soon as possible, more especially having regard to the extremely limited reserve of land of any sort in this Colony.

His Excellency the Governor, we are glad to learn, is anxious to see this land set free or applied to the purposes for which it was originally intended, and we sincerely hope that the War Office may be induced to recognise the advisability of proceeding with the scheme of fortification of Hongkong without further delay. The capital for the purpose has already been provided, and, seeing that the Millennium is no nearer than when the island was first ceded to Great Britain, the propriety of placing it in a position to defy the assaults of an enemy must be apparent to all thinking men.

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Enclosure. 36 # THE FORTIFICATION OF HONG-KONG. The position of Hongkong as an entrepôt for British trade and as an important link in the chain of outposts by which British commerce with the East is nourished and protected, has been well defined by Captain Colomb and other writers. The value of this small Colony politically and commercially is great enough to entitle it to rank as the Malta of the East. As the farthest outpost of the vast and scattered dependencies of the British Empire, it should most assuredly be so defended as to render its easy retention in time of war a matter of no possible doubt. But is this the fact? It is generally admitted that any great European Power would have little difficulty, in the event of a war, in entering these waters and levying a heavy indemnity upon the Colony. As there is never less than a million and a half sterling in bullion in Hongkong, the opportunity of seizing this treasure would be a strong temptation to a nation like Russia to make a sudden descent upon it. But, it may be objected, England is not at war, and there is, happily, no prospect of any rupture with either of the great European Powers. The piping times of peace may, however, at any moment vanish through some unlooked for dispute, unexpected aggression. As the illustrious Washington truly remarked, in one of his most famous speeches, “to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." And, similarly, to render Hongkong an impregnable fortress would be the best method of deterring attack. We believe that a scheme for the efficient fortification of this colony has been prepared and, if not actually approved, has been in consideration by the Imperial Government for some years past. The cost is estimated at something like £400,000, and the project is, as may be imagined, a large and effective one. But the expense is apparently the impediment to the progress of the work: the Home Government do not relish the outlay of so large a sum on a distant dependency. Out of sight, out of mind is a homely proverb which unfortunately applies only too well to the relations of the Imperial Government with its smaller Crown Colonies, and action with regard to them seldom comes before the imperative necessity for it has been unmistakably demonstrated. It would surely be a great mistake to wait for such a necessity to be shown in the case of the fortifications of Hongkong. Moreover, the question is not only a colonial question, it is an imperial one. It cannot even be pleaded that the Colony is a source of expense to the Home Government. Hongkong has long maintained itself, and has for some twenty years past contributed twenty thousand pounds sterling per annum towards the cost of the garrison. We do not for a moment dispute the fairness of this contribution, for the Colony can well afford it, but seeing that the garrison is maintained primarily for Imperial purposes, the annual contribution should be devoted to the work of fortifying the place. This was done in the case of the Ionian Islands when they were under British rule. The military contribution there was regularly spent upon the defences of the islands, and there is no reason why the same rule should not be applied to Hongkong. This Colony has already paid into the Imperial Treasury a sum sufficient to cover the cost of the proposed scheme of fortification. But this is not all: indirectly a further involuntary contribution is being made by the Colony which does no good to anyone. It is estimated that the land which is now reserved in case it should be required for the projected fortifications would yield an income of some ten to fifteen thousand pounds a year, all of which is lost by the land lying idle. This is a waste that proves of advantage to no one, and should be put a stop to as soon as possible, more especially having regard to the extremely limited reserve of land of any sort in this Colony. His Excellency the Governor, we are glad to learn, is anxious to see this land set free or applied to the purposes for which it was originally intended, and we sincerely hope that the War Office may be induced to recognise the advisability of proceeding with the scheme of fortification of Hongkong without further delay. The capital for the purpose has already been provided, and, seeing that the Millennium is no nearer than when the island was first ceded to Great Britain, the propriety of placing it in a position to defy the assaults of an enemy must be apparent to all thinking men.
Baseline (Original)
Enclosure. 36 THE FORTIFICATION OF HONG- KONG. The position of Hongkong as an entrepôt for British trade and as an important link in the chain of outposts by which British com- merce with the East is nourished and pro- tected, has been well defined by Captain COLOME and other writers. The value of this small Colony politically and commer- cially is great enough to entitle it to rank as the Malta of the East. As the farthest outpost of the vast and scattered depen- dencies of the British Empire, it should most assuredly be so defended as to render its easy retention in time of war a matter of uo possible doubt. But is this the fact? It is generally admitted that any great Eu- ropean Power would have little difficulty, in the event of a war, in entering these waters and levying a heavy indemnity upon the Colony. As there is never less than a mil- lion and a half sterling in bullion in Hong- kong, the opportunity of seizing this treasure would be a strong temptation to a nation like Russia to make a sudden descent upon it. But, it may be objected, England is not at war, and there is, happily, no prospect of any rupture with either of the great Eu- ropean Powers. The piping times of peace may, however, at any moment vanish through some unlooked for dispute, unexpected aggression. As the illustrious WASHINGTON truly remarked, in one of his most famous speeches, “to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." And, similarly, to render Hongkong an impregnable fortress would be the best method of deterring at- tack. gome We believe that a scheme for the efficient fortification of this colony has been prepared and, if not actually approved, has been in con- sideration by the Imperial Government for some years past. The cost is estimated at something like £400,000, and the project is, as may be imagined, a large and effective one, i But the expense is apparently the impedi ment to the progress of the work: the home: Government do not relish the outlay of so large a sum on a distant dependency. Out Fof sight out of mind is a homely proverb which unfortunately applies only too well to the relations of the Imperial Government with it'smaller Crown Colonies, and action with regard to them seldom comes before the imperative necessity for it has been unmistakeably demonstrated. It would surely be a great mistake to wait for such a necessity to be shown in the case of the fortifications of Hongkong. Moreover the question is not only a colonial question, it is an imperial one. It cannot even be pleaded that the Colony is a source of expense ! to the Home Government. Hongkong has long maintained itself, and has for some twenty years past contributed twenty thou- sand pounds sterling per annum towards the cost of the garrison. We do not for a moment dispute the fairness of this con- tribution, for the Colony can well afford it, but seeing that the garrison is maintained primarily for Imperial purposes, the annual contribution should be devoted to the work of fortifying the place. This was done in the case of the Ionian Islands when they were under British rule. The military con- tribution there was regularly spent upon the defences of the islands, aud WA 80C no reason why the same rulo should not be applied to Hongkong. This Colony has already aid into the Imperial Treasury a su sufficient to cover the cost of the pro- posed scheme of fortification. But this is not all: indirectly a further involuntary con- tribution is being made by the Colony which does no good to any one. It is estimated that the land which is now reserved in case it: should be required for the projected fortifi- cations would yield au income of some ten to fifteen thousand pounds a year, all of which is lost by the land lying idle. This is a waste that proves of advantage to no one, and should be put a stop to as soon as possible, more especially having regard to the extremely limited reserve of land of any sort in this Colony. His Excellency the GOVERNOR, WE are glad to learn, is anxious to see this land set free or applied to the purposes for which it was originally intended, and we sincerely hope that the War Office may be induced to recognise the advisability of proceeding with the scheme of fortification of Hongkong without further delay. The capital for the purpose has already been provided, and, see- ing that the Millennium is no nearer than when the island was first ceded to Great Britain, the propriety of placing it in a position to defy the assaults of an enemy must be apparent to all thinking men,
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Enclosure.

36

THE FORTIFICATION OF HONG-

KONG.

The position of Hongkong as an entrepôt for British trade and as an important link in the chain of outposts by which British com- merce with the East is nourished and pro- tected, has been well defined by Captain COLOME and other writers. The value of this small Colony politically and commer- cially is great enough to entitle it to rank as the Malta of the East. As the farthest outpost of the vast and scattered depen- dencies of the British Empire, it should most assuredly be so defended as to render its easy retention in time of war a matter of uo possible doubt. But is this the fact? It is generally admitted that any great Eu- ropean Power would have little difficulty, in the event of a war, in entering these waters and levying a heavy indemnity upon the Colony. As there is never less than a mil- lion and a half sterling in bullion in Hong- kong, the opportunity of seizing this treasure would be a strong temptation to a nation like Russia to make a sudden descent upon it. But, it may be objected, England is not at war, and there is, happily, no prospect of any rupture with either of the great Eu- ropean Powers. The piping times of peace may, however, at any moment vanish through some unlooked for dispute, unexpected aggression. As the illustrious WASHINGTON truly remarked, in one of his most famous speeches, “to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." And, similarly, to render Hongkong an impregnable fortress would be the best method of deterring at- tack.

gome

We believe that a scheme for the efficient fortification of this colony has been prepared and, if not actually approved, has been in con- sideration by the Imperial Government for some years past. The cost is estimated at something like £400,000, and the project is, as may be imagined, a large and effective one, i But the expense is apparently the impedi ment to the progress of the work: the home: Government do not relish the outlay of so large a sum on a distant dependency. Out

Fof sight out of mind is a homely proverb which unfortunately applies only too well to the relations of the Imperial Government with it'smaller Crown Colonies, and action with regard to them seldom comes before the imperative necessity for it has been unmistakeably demonstrated. It would surely be a great mistake to wait for such a necessity to be shown in the case of the fortifications of Hongkong. Moreover the question is not only a colonial question, it is an imperial one. It cannot even be pleaded that the Colony is a source of expense ! to the Home Government. Hongkong has long maintained itself, and has for some twenty years past contributed twenty thou- sand pounds sterling per annum towards the cost of the garrison. We do not for a moment dispute the fairness of this con- tribution, for the Colony can well afford it, but seeing that the garrison is maintained primarily for Imperial purposes, the annual contribution should be devoted to the work of fortifying the place. This was done in the case of the Ionian Islands when they were under British rule. The military con- tribution there was regularly spent upon the defences of the islands, aud WA 80C no reason why the same rulo should not be applied to Hongkong. This Colony has already aid into the Imperial Treasury a su sufficient to cover the cost of the pro- posed scheme of fortification. But this is not all: indirectly a further involuntary con- tribution is being made by the Colony which does no good to any one. It is estimated

that the land which is now reserved in case it: should be required for the projected fortifi- cations would yield au income of some ten to fifteen thousand pounds a year, all of which is lost by the land lying idle. This is a waste that proves of advantage to no one, and should be put a stop to as soon as possible, more especially having regard to the extremely limited reserve of land of any sort in this Colony. His Excellency the GOVERNOR, WE are glad to learn, is anxious to see this land set free or applied to the purposes for which it was originally intended, and we sincerely hope that the War Office may be induced to recognise the advisability of proceeding with the scheme of fortification of Hongkong without further delay. The capital for the purpose has already been provided, and, see- ing that the Millennium is no nearer than when the island was first ceded to Great Britain, the propriety of placing it in a position to defy the assaults of an enemy must be apparent to all thinking men,

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